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APPELLATE FRUIT SALAD AND OTHER CONCEPTS:
A SHORT COURSE IN APPELLATE PROCESS
Foreword
Writing and arguing an appellate brief is a rite of passage in law
school, an important part of the law school experience shared by virtually all lawyers. 1 Appellate brief writing was one of the first "skills
education" activities introduced in the law school curriculum,2 and it
is one that continues to be used at the majority of American law
schools. 3 Thousands of students participate in moot court annually
through the required curriculum, co-curricular moot court competitions, or both. 4 Lawyers may recall their moot court experience with
joy and exhilaration, terror and anguish, or anything in between, but
no one forgets it.
Usually, instruction on the appellate problem emphasizes the substantive issues in the appeal and techniques for effective written and
1. Amy E. Sloan, Erasing Lines: Integrating the Law School Curriculum, 1 J. AsS'N
LEGAL WRITlNG DIRECTORS 3, 6 (2002); see also J. Christopher Rideout & Jill
J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REv. 35, 53-55 (1994)
(discussing common experiences that define the legal discourse community). I would describe it as part of the lawyer's secret handshake, in other
words, an experience integral to membership in the legal subculture.
2. Steve Sheppard, An Informal History of How Law Schools Evaluate Students,
With a Predictable Emphasis on Law School Final Exams, 65 UMKC L. REv. 657
(1997). Sheppard describes pre-revolutionary English legal education,
which used moot court arguments as tools both for teaching and evaluating
students. Id. at 658-59. This was also true of American legal education beginning as early as the eighteenth century. Id. at 689-90.
3. Association of Legal Writing Directors/Legal Writing Institute, 2004
ALWD/LltW Survey Highlights 10, http://www.alwd.org/alwdResources/
surveys/ 2004surveyresults.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2005) [hereinafter
ALWD/LltW Survey] (tabulating the responses of 176 schools regarding legal
writing curriculum and revealing that over 80% of law schools require students to write an appellate brief as part of the required legal writing curriculum). This figure has remained fairly constant over time. Compare id., with
Committee on Appellate Skills Training, Appellate Litigation Skills Training:
The Role of the Law Schools, 54 U. CiN. L. REv. 129, 141 & n.13 (1985) [hereinafter Appellate Litigation Skills Training] (reporting data from 1984 indicating that 82% of law schools required students to participate in appellate
moot court).
4. American Bar Association, 2004 Enrollment Statistics 1, http://www.abanet.
org/legaled/statistics/fa1l2004enrollment.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2005)
(reporting that 48,239 first-year students enrolled in the 188 accredited law
schools in the fall of 2004). At least 38,591 students, then, wrote appellate
briefs in the 2004-2005 academic year alone (80% of 48,239). See ALWD/
LltW Survey, supra note 3, at 10. This does not include students who elect to
participate in co-curricular, intra- or inter-scholastic moot court competitions, which would increase the number significantly.
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oral advocacy.5 This is entirely appropriate. But the appellate experience is also an excellent vehicle for familiarizing students with some
of the fundamental concepts of appellate process. Indeed, unless students seek out additional instruction in appellate procedure, their
work on an appellate problem for a legal writing class or moot court
competition may be their only exposure to the subject in law schoo1. 6
If the appellate experience does not incorporate instruction on appellate process, most students will head into internships, clerkships, and
practice without knowing much about the procedural aspects of
appeals.
As is often the case, the problem is time. Unless the appellate problem turns on issues of appellate process (and very few do), it is difficult to make time to devote to instruction on matters not directly
related to completing the project at hand. This article attempts to
solve this problem by providing students with a short course in appellate process. It explains three important aspects of appellate procedure: standing to appeal, the timing of an appeal, and the extent of
appellate review. It then provides hypothetical fact patterns and questions to review the concepts. Students can read the text and complete
the questions on their own, or professors can assign the reading and
use the questions for class discussion. Either way, students will benefit
from exposure to some of the fundamentals of appellate process.

5. See Robert]. Martineau, Moot Court: Too Much Moot and Not Enough Court, 67
A.B.A.]. 1294 (1981), reprinted in ROBERT]' MARTINEAU, FUNDAMENTALS OF
MODERN APPELLATE ADvOCACY app. 3, at 207-09 (1985).
6. Appellate Litigation Skills Training, supra note 3, at 129. This article contains
the report and recommendation of the American Bar Association's Committee on Appellate Skills Training of the Appellate Judges' Conference,
Judicial Administration Division. The report decries the lack of training in
appellate litigation skills in American law schools. See generally id.

APPELLATE FRUIT SALAD AND OTHER CONCEPTS:
A SHORT COURSE IN APPELLATE PROCESS
Amy E. Sloan*
I.

THREE IMPORTANT CONCEPTS IN APPELLATE PROCESS

Three procedural issues are important in every appeal: (1) who is
entitled to appeal; (2) when an order can be appealed; and (3) how
much review the appellate court will give to the lower court's decision. 1 Each of these issues is discussed below. 2
1.

"Who is Entitled to Appeal?

This may sound obvious, but only an aggrieved party to a case can
appeal an order in the case. 3 Many people may have an interest in a
case, but unless they become parties and subject themselves directly to
the risks of litigation, they cannot appea1. 4 Further, unless the party is

*

1.

2.
3.
4.

Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would
like to thank the participants at the 2004 Rocky Mountain Legal Writing
Conference, Stephen Shapiro, and Ann MacNeilie for their feedback on
the ideas expressed in this paper. I would also like to thank Tamara D.
Sanders for providing research assistance.
© 2006 Amy E. Sloan. Permission is granted to copy this article for
educational uses, as long as the copies are distributed at or below cost,
identity the author and journal, and contain notice of copyright.
MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES,
AND PERSONNEL 5 (1994):
[A]n appellate court can be activated only pursuant to a rather
elaborate array of rules deriving from statutes, court-made doctrines, written rules of procedure, or some combination of these.
This technically intricate body of law governs access to the appellate courts, determining when, how, and by whom appellate authority can be invoked.
The discussion focuses on federal law. Often, state law regarding appellate
procedure tracks federal law. Id. at 32.
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980).
Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) ("The rule that only parties to a
lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled.") (citations omitted); United States v. Seigel, 168 F.2d
143, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ("It has long been settled that one who is not a
party to a record and judgment is not entitled to appeal therefrom.") (citations omitted); see also FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) ("The notice of an appeal shall
specity the party or parties taking the appeal . . . . ") (emphasis added);
United States v. British Am. Tobacco (Invs.) Ltd., 387 F.3d 884, 888 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (determining that a company that intervened in a case for a
limited purpose could not appeal an order relating to a different aspect of
the case).
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aggrieved by the outcome, he or she cannot appea1. 5
For example, individuals or groups may seek permission to file amicus curiae briefs in a case. 6 The individuals or groups filing the briefs
advocate a particular outcome in the case. 7 They often have a stake in
the outcome of the litigation; their own lives may well be affected by
the court's ruling. Nevertheless, because they are not parties to the
litigation, they may not pursue an appeal of a decision they consider
adverse. 8
As another example, interest groups advocating particular legal
views often become involved in litigation. If the group itself is a party
to the case, it can appeal an adverse decision. 9 Sometimes, however,

5.
6.

7.

8.
9.

Of course, rare exceptions to this principle exist, such as when a news
organization is permitted to appeal a ruling that affects the organization's
ability to cover a trial. In that case, the news organization is aggrieved by
the decision, although it is not a party to the underlying action. See, e.g., In
re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 608 (2d Cir. 1988) (recognizing news organization's standing to challenge a gag order). See generally
Annotation, Standing of Media Representatives or Organizations to Seek Review of,
or to Interoene to oppose, Order Closing Criminal Proceedings to Public, 74 AL.R.
4th 476 (2003). These exceptions, however, are few and far between.
See infra notes 16-20 (discussing when a party is aggrieved).
An amicus curiae is, literally, a "friend of the court," that is, "[a] person
who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by
the court to file a brief in the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 2004).
Thus, an amicus brief, is a brief filed by a non-party to assist the court in
deciding a case. Id. The brief can only be filed with the court's permission.
FED. R. APP. P. 29 (establishing the process for seeking leave to file an amicus brief in the federal appellate courts); see also SUP. CT. R. 37(1) ("An
amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter
not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable
help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose
burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored."). In Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003), for example, thirty-three groups filed amicus briefs, including: the ACLU of Texas, the Pro Family Law Center, the American
Public Health Association, the National Mental Health Association, the
American Orthopsychiatric Association, AIDS Action, the National Alliance
of State and Territorial Aids Directors, the Association of Nurses in AIDS
Care, the National Minority AIDS Council, and the Whitman-Walker Clinic,
among others. Amicus briefs are commonly filed with appellate courts, but
they can be filed with trial courts as well. See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d
1237, 1260 (9th Cir. 1982) (determining that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by permitting an amicus to participate in the case).
See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief From Friendship to Advocacy, 72
YALE LJ. 694, 704 (1963) (noting that, at the Supreme Court, "[t]he amicus
is treated as a potential litigant in future cases, as an ally of one of the
parties, or as the representative of an interest not otherwise represented .... Thus, the institution of the amicus curiae brief has moved from
neutrality to partisanship, from friendship to advocacy.").
United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 525, 528 (E.D. La. 1989) (noting
that participation in a case as amicus does not confer standing to appeal);
see also supra note 4.
A complete discussion of the requirements for an organization to have
standing to initiate an action on behalf of its members is beyond the scope
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the interest group's lawyers merely represent one of the parties in the
case whose claim or defense is consistent with the interest group's
aims. lo In the latter case, the group is not a party to the litigation and
cannot appeal an adverse decision if the party the group represents
decides not to pursue an appeal. 11
When an individual or entity has a stake in the outcome of a case,
that person or group may be able to become a party to the litigation
by intervening in the case. It is possible to intervene at the trial level
or the appellate level. I2 Indeed, it is possible to intervene solely for
the purpose of pursuing an appeal that an original party does not wish
to pursue. I3 Appellate courts are hesitant, however, to allow intervention at the appellate stage. Doing so allows someone to stay on the
sidelines, leaving others to take on the risk and expense of litigation,

10.

11.
12.

13.

of this article. Compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (holding that the NAACP had standing both to pursue its own rights and to assert the rights of its members in a challenge to Virginia state statutes), with
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (holding that the Sierra
Club, as an organization with a special interest in environmental protection, lacked standing to challenge agency action). Suffice it to say, however, that if an organization has standing to bring an action as a party, it
also has standing to appeal, assuming, of course, that the organization is
aggrieved by the outcome in the trial court. See supra note 3.
See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 248 (2003) (listing attorneys from
the ACLU Foundation; NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.;
ACLU Fund of Michigan, Lansing, Mich.; ACLU Fund of Michigan, Detroit, Mich.; and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund
as counsel for several respondents in the case). None of these organizations, though, was a party to the case. Id.
Brown v. Grand Trunk W. RR Co., 124 F.2d 1016, 1016 (6th Cir. 1941)
(noting that an attorney lacks standing to pursue an appeal except on behalf of a client); see also supra note 4.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governs intervention in an action before
a federal district court. FED. R CN. P. 24. A person or entity may seek
leave of the district court to intervene after the conclusion of the case for
purposes of filing a notice of appeal, although intervention must take place
before the expiration of the time for filing the notice of appeal. Jenkins ex
rel. Agyei v. Missouri, 967 F.2d 1245, 1247 (8th Cir. 1992). Further, courts
have granted requests to intervene made by motion at the appellate level
for the purpose of pursuing the appeal. See cases cited infra note 13; see
also FED. R APP. P. 15 (governing petitions to intervene at the appellate
level in appeals of administrative decisions); FED. R APP. P. 44 (governing
intervention of the Attorney General of the United States or a state in certain actions in the appellate courts concerning the constitutionality of a
statute).
See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1985) (granting motion filed with the appellate court to intervene after the original party abandoned the appeal); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 655 F.2d 882, 883 (8th
Cir. 1982) (granting motion filed with the appellate court to intervene in
the case); cf United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 396 (1977)
(determining that a class member's postjudgment motion to intervene for
purposes of appealing denial of class certification was timely filed); Marino
v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1998) (holding that retitioners who failed to
intervene for purpose of appeal could not appea the consent decree entered by the district court).
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until the case is resolved at the trial level. 14 Ordinarily, a person or
entity that wishes to participate in the case and influence the outcome
must intervene at an earlier stage, rather than waiting until the
appeal. 15
In addition to being a party, the person or entity wishing to pursue
an appeal must be aggrieved by the outcome. 16 Parties who get all of
the relief they requested cannot appeal. 17 You may well wonder why a
winning party would want to appeal. Sometimes a victory on the merits does not accomplish a party's goal. A party may wish, for example,
to establish a precedent governing future cases or persuade a court to
adopt a particular legal theory in resolving the litigated issue. l8 If that
party were to win with a different theory or on procedural grounds,
such as lack of jurisdiction, the litigation will not have achieved the
party's true goal, and the party may feel aggrieved. I9 The right result
for the wrong reason, however, does not make a party aggrieved. 20 As
long as the party obtained all of the requested relief and the outcome
is favorable, the party cannot appeal.
14. Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l v. Donovan, 771 F.2d 1551, 1552-53 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
15. DANlELJOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 54 (1994).
16. "Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district
court may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom. A party who
receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment
affording the relief and cannot appeal from it." Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank
v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326,333 (1980). In rare cases, a winning party may be
able to appeal an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on the merits,
id., but that is not the usual circumstance. See generally MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 53-54.
17. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 445 U.S. at 333.
18. Watson v. City of Newark, 746 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1984).
19. A court's failure to base its decision on a party's preferred legal theory may
leave open an avenue for the defeated party to accomplish an end-run
around the judgment. In Watson, for example, city employees sought to
appeal a district court's judgment in their favor based on a finding that the
city charter was "impermissibly vague." [d. The employees had sought relief
based on another theory, one that distinguished between partisan and nonpartisan political speech, to which the district court, in dictum, declined to
give weight. Id. As the appellate court recognized, the result of the decision was that the city "lost a battle but won the war." Id. Although the plaintiffs won a favorable judgment, the city could justify resuming the
challenged policy under the theory that was effectively rejected by the district court. Id. Nevertheless, the court of appeals determined that the
plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the judgment and, therefore, lacked standing to appeal. Id.; see also, e.g., Olsen v. Jacklowitz, 74 F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir.
1935) (dismissing an appeal by a defendant concerned about a subsequent
suit against him despite a favorable decision below dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint for lack of jurisdiction).
20. See Watson, 746 F.2d at 1010; see also Nunez v. Canik, 576 So. 2d 1080, 1083
(La. Ct. App. 1991) (" [AJ party appealing a judgment in his favor does not
have the right to appeal simply in order to have the judgment based upon a
different ground.").
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To have standing to appeal a decision, a person or entity must be a
party to the case, whether by suing, by being sued, or by intervening in
the case. Participation as counselor amicus is insufficient to confer
standing to appeal. In addition, the party must be aggrieved by an
adverse outcome in the case.

2.

When Can an Order be Appealed?

The final order doctrine provides that an appeal can only be taken
from a final order, that is, an order that finally resolves litigation on
the merits. 21 Authority for federal appellate courts to hear appeals of
federal district court decisions comes from 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which
confers jurisdiction over appeals of "all final decisions" of federal district courts. 22 Although the final order doctrine is the rule applied in
most cases, several exceptions exist. Principles found in statutes, procedural rules, and court decisions provide avenues for obtaining immediate (or interlocutory) review of an issue prior to the conclusion
of the litigation and the entry of a final order. To pursue any appeal,
you must know the basis of the appellate court's jurisdiction. 23
21. A final decision is one that terminates the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing to be done except enforcement of the judgment. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275 (1988) (citing Caitlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). It cannot be a
provisional disposition of the issue, nor can it be merely a step toward final
disposition of the merits. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920). Further, a final order is one that disposes of the entire controversy; that is, it
resolves all claims with respect to all parties. Id.; see also Brooks v. Fitch, 642
F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 528 F.2d
710,712 (3d Cir. 1975).
22. This section provides that the federal circuit courts "shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States
. . . . " Many states have similar provisions. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 4(b) (granting district courts of appeal jurisdiction to hear appeals of "finaljudgments or orders of trial courts); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC.
§ 12-301 (LexisNexis 2002) (granting a right to appeal the final judgment
of a trial court). In the federal courts, the appeal is to an intermediate
appellate court. This is also true in most states, although in a few states, the
appeal is directly to the court oflast resort because there is no intermediate
appellate court. The ten states without intermediate appellate courts are
Delaware, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Compare MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 144-45 (listing states without intermediate appellate
courts as of 1994), with KENT C. OLSON, LEGAL INFORMATION: How TO FIND
IT, How TO USE IT 282 (1999) (providing updated data on states that have
added intermediate appellate courts). See generally AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS & STRATEGIES 73-75 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the
structure of federal and state court systems).
23. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) (4) (D) requires the appellant's
brief to include "an assertion that the appeal is from a final order or judgment that disposes of all parties' claims, or information establishing the
court of appeals' jurisdiction on some other basis." The appellee's brief
may omit the jurisdictional statement unless the appellee disagrees with the
appellant's statement. FED. R. APP. P. 28(b).
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The rules regarding when orders can be appealed illustrate the tension between three sometimes-competing values that appellate courts
try to balance: efficiency, finality, and accuracy.24 The interest in efficiency supports the final order rule. It is usually more efficient to
evaluate all potential errors at the conclusion of the litigation, especially because some errors may be corrected before the end of the
case or may prove to be harmless. 25 The interest in the finality of
litigation also supports the rule that only final orders can be appealed.
Otherwise, cases could bounce back and forth between the trial and
appellate levels, taking far too long to conclude. 26 The interest in accuracy, on the other hand, might counsel adherence to a rule permitting interlocutory appeals. Some mistakes cannot be corrected once
they have determined the course of litigation, some cases are so complex that requiring all parties to wait until all claims are resolved to
appeal may work injustice, and some questions may be so important
or controversial that delaying their resolution would create unwarranted confusion or uncertainty in the legallandscape. 27 In those circumstances, interlocutory appeals might be advantageous.
The balance among these values, in most cases, supports application of the final order rule, but with exceptions for the types of issues
for which delay in appellate review presents problems. Some of the
more common exceptions include: 28 orders involving injunctions;29
24. Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Arror, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 79, 90 (1988) (recognizing appellate values of accuracy,
finality, and efficiency); see also Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process:
Court Rulemakinf5> Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. LJ.
887,913 (1999) (arguing that accuracy should be the preeminent consideration in judicial rulemaking).
25. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 45-46.
26. Justice Frankfurter explained the rationale underlying the final order rule:
Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure. It was written into the first Judiciary Act
and has been departed from only when observance of it would
practically defeat the right to any review at all. Since the right to a
judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a
necessary ingredient of justice, Congress from the very beginning
has, by forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for
practical purposes is a single controversy, set itself against enfeeblingjudicial administration. Thereby is avoided the obstruction to
just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and
cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to
which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment. To be effective, judicial administration must not be leadenfooted. Its momentum would be arrested by permitting separate
reviews of the component elements in a unified cause.
Cobble dick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940) (footnotes
omitted).
27. ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE CIVIL PRACTICE - FEDERAL AND
STATE APPEALS §§ 4.1-.2, at 47-49 (1983) (discussing how the finality rule
promotes efficiency but can be in tension with accuracy).
28. The number of exceptions may well increase in the future because the Supreme Court is now empowered to adopt rules designating additional types
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orders involving unsettled questions of law, which can be certified for
immediate appeal;30 orders dismissing a claim or party in a case with
multiple claims or parties;31 and so-called "collateral" orders. 32 In addition, the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus provide
vehicles for obtaining immediate appellate review of issues that are
not otherwise immediately appealable. 33 Comparing different types
of orders to pieces of fruit, an analogy I call "appellate fruit salad,"
helps classify orders to determine whether they are subject to the final
order rule or fall within one of its exceptions.
A case subject to the final order doctrine is analogous to a whole
apple. One involving an injunction or issue certified for immediate
appeal is analogous to an apple with a bite taken out of it. A case with
multiple claims or parties is analogous to a bunch of grapes. A case
involving a collateral order is analogous to a cashew fruit, while one
involving an extraordinary writ is analogous to a watermelon.
In an appellate court's eyes, most cases are like apples. Just as an
apple is a single piece of fruit, most cases are single pieces of litigation. The plaintiff sues the defendant on a claim, the claim is resolved
by motion or trial, and the case is concluded. The order that concludes the litigation on the merits, leaving nothing substantive for the
trial court to do, is appealable to a higher court. 34
Appellate courts are strongly disinclined to disturb the integrity of
the apple. In other words, they do not like litigants to be able to take
a bite out of the apple to appeal some intermediate aspect of the
case. 35 Appellate courts prefer that the entire case - the whole apple
- come to them at once. 36 This makes sense when the purpose of the
review is error correction, the primary function of intermediate appelof orders as immediately appealable. 28 v.s.c. § 1292(e) (2000) ("The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with section 2072 of this
title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of
appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or
(d).").

28 v.s.c. § 1292(a)(1) (2000).
[d. § 1292(b).
FED. R. CIY. P. 54(b).
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 V.S. 541, 546 (1949).
The All Writs Act, 28 V.S.C. § 1651 (a) (2000).
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 V.S. 271, 275 (1988)
(quoting Caitlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)) ("This Court
long has stated that as a general rule a district court's decision is appealable
under [§ 1291] only when the decision 'ends the litigation on the merits
and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' ").
35. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380
(1987) (explaining that interlocutory appeals can result in disruption, delay, and expense for litigants, "burden appellate courts by requiring immediate consideration of issues that may become moot or irrelevant by the
end of trial," and interfere with the trialjudge's authority to supervise litigation without interference).
36. Cobble dick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-35 (1940).
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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late courts,37 and is consistent with the values of efficiency, finality,
and accuracy.
Sometimes, however, appellate courts permit litigants to take a bite
out of the apple and take an interlocutory appeal of some aspect of
the case. Two types of orders subject to interlocutory review are those
involving injunctions and those certified for immediate appeal. Authority for the federal appellate courts to hear these cases comes from
28 U.S.C. § 1292.
Subsection (a) of the statute confers jurisdiction for interlocutory
appeals of orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions
.... "38 In the case of injunctions, the exception is consistent with the
value of accuracy, and in this case, accuracy trumps efficiency and finality. This is because the grant or denial or modification or refusal
to modify an injunction can have irreversible consequences that cannot be remedied later. 39 Thus, the cost of an erroneous decision is
too high to delay review until the conclusion of the case. Also, injunctions affect behavior, either requiring or prohibiting litigants to act in
particular ways. For an injunction issued before the conclusion of the
litigation, the grant of relief prior to proof of entitlement to it is an
extraordinary remedy.40 Given the length of time many cases take to
conclude, a preliminary grant of relief may remain in effect for
yearsY To require the affected party to wait until the conclusion of
the litigation to demonstrate error is too high a price to impose.
37. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3-4; PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL.,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2 (1976).
38. 28 U.S.c. § 1292(a)(1). The statute also provides a mechanism for appealing other types of equitable matters, such as the appointment of receivers
and decisions in admiralty cases. Id. § 1292(a) (2)-(3). For purposes of simplicity, I have limited the appellate fruit salad analogy to cases involving
injunctions and orders certified for immediate appeal.
39. See Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525 (1897) (explaining that
the grant or continuation of an injunction can have irreparable consequences); Cohen v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of
N]., 867 F.2d 1455, 1465 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that the serious consequences flowing from denials and modifications of injunctions justifY interlocutory appeals of those orders); see also Stewart-Warner Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 830 (3d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, j.,
dissenting) (explaining that orders denying injunctions are immediately
appealable because the erroneous denial of an injunction may cause irreparable injury).
40. Frank's GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d
Cir. 1988) (recognizing that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
remedy); see also Williams v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 251
(W.D. Tex. 1992) (recognizing that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy).
41. See, e.g., Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health and
Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing a preliminary injunction that was entered eight years before a final judgment);
Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 983 F.2d 1267, 1269 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing a
preliminary injunction that had been in effect for more than fifteen years);
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In the case of orders certified for immediate appeal, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292 recognizes the occasional need for such an interlocutory appeal, but makes obtaining it difficult. Subsection (b) provides as
follows:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order
not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the
opinion that such order involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be
taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten
days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in
the district court unless the district judge or the Court of
Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.42
:
The statute imposes several conditions before the appeal can be
heard. First, the order at issue must arise in a civil case, not a criminal
case. 43 Second, it must involve "a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion . . . . "44
Third, the aggrieved party must persuade the district court to certifY
the order for immediate appea1. 45 Finally, the circuit court must
choose to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal immediately.46
Otherwise, the appeal must be taken in the normal course upon the
conclusion of the litigation.
This process is consistent with the values of efficiency, accuracy, and
finality. Although in most cases, it is more efficient to wait until the
conclusion of a case to hear all errors in one appeal, in the case of a
controlling question of law, it may be more efficient for the appellate
court to resolve the issue immediately.47 Unlike other types of errors

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.

Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549,551 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing a preliminary injunction that had been in place for six years). Statistics collected by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
show that many civil cases in the federal courts take years to conclude. As
of September 30, 2004, 12.6% of civil cases in federal district courts had
been pending for three years or longer. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 2004, app., tbl.C-6 at 165 (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus
2004/ appendices/ c6. pdf.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hickey v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.), 270
F. Supp. 2d 357, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting certification for interlocutory appeal of an order concerning the scope of federal jurisdiction be-
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that may be corrected before the end of the litigation or may turn out
to be harmless, an error in the application of a controlling question of
law results in wasted resources. 48 Although the immediate appeal can
delay the resolution of the case in the trial court, it can improve the
overall efficiency of the judicial process by resolving the legal question
before trial. This is also consistent with the goal of accuracy because it
allows for immediate review of any potentially erroneous decision.
The certification process could be seen as in conflict with the value
of finality. To the extent that it is, the interests in efficiency and accuracy trump finality in this instance. The provisions requiring the district court to certify the order as final and allowing the court of
appeals the discretion to decline to hear the appeal immediately help
reduce the effect on finality by ensuring that only those issues truly
meriting immediate review get past the procedural hurdles. 49
Of course, not all cases are like unitary, whole pieces of fruit. Some
involve multiple parties or multiple claims, which, although arising
from the same set of facts, are separable. The apt comparison here is
not with an apple, but rather, with a bunch of grapes. In these cases,
each claim (or set of claims) against each party can be separated from
other aspects of the case without disturbing the integrity of the case
(fruit) as a whole. Taking a grape off a bunch is not the same as
taking a bite out of an apple.
Authority for an appeal under these circumstances comes from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which provides as follows:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. 50
cause doing so would avoid uncertainty regarding the binding effect of the
court's ruling and the potential duplication of proceedings).
48. Mineo v. Port Auth., 779 F.2d 939, 942 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining
that the district court certified an order regarding coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act for immediate appeal to avoid wasting resources with a
lengthy proceeding to establish damages in the event that the district
court's ruling on the controlling question of law was later overturned).
49. See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts,
58 CEO; WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1172-75 (1990) (discussing the limitations on
interloc'utory appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and compiling statistics showing that appellate courts rarely exercise their discretion to accept
such appeals).
50. Many states have directly adopted rules that are identical or substantially
similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), including, for example,
Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Utah, and Wyoming. HAw. R. ClY. P. 54(b);
IDAHO R. ClY. P. 54(b); MASs. R. ClY. P. 54(b); UTAH R. ClY. P. 54(b); WYO.
R. ClY. P. 54(b).
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This rule is similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), concerning certification of
an order for immediate appeal, in that it applies only to civil cases and
gives the district court the discretion to decide whether to direct entry
of an order subject to immediate appeal. It differs, however, in other
respects. The order at issue need not involve a controlling question of
law about which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.
In addition, the appellate court does not have discretion to refuse the
appeal. Once the district court directs entry of final judgment, the
order becomes immediately appealable as a final order. Despite the
differences between this rule and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), each provision
reflects a similar balance among efficiency, accuracy, and finality.
Another exception to the final order rule is the collateral order
doctrine. The collateral order doctrine originated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 51 This was a shareholder derivative action
that required the district court to decide whether a state statute requiring the plaintiffs to post a bond applied. 52 The district court
ruled that the statute did not apply, and the defendant appealed. 53
Before addressing the merits of the case, the Supreme Court 'had to
determine whether the order was appealable, given that the district
court's judgment did not resolve the litigation finally on the merits. 54
The Court determined that the order was subject to immediate appeal, saying that the
decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and
too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated. 55
The Supreme Court's enunciation of the collateral order rule in Cohen
was eventually distilled into three elements. A collateral order "must
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."56
51. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
52. [d. at 543.
53. [d. at 545. The Court of Appeals reversed, Cohen appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. [d.
54. ld. at 545-46.
55. [d. at 546.
56. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (quoting numerous
cases to reaffirm the elements of the collateral order doctrine and rejecting
the "death knell" test developed by the courts of appeals in which orders
that sounded the "death knell" of an action had been immediatelyappealable under Cohen without necessarily meeting the three required elements),
superseded lYy rule, 177 F.R.D. 530,530-31 (1998). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) now gives federal appellate courts the discretion to hear appeals of orders granting or denying class certification, including when the
order at issue sounds the "death knell" of class action litigation. Blair v.
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Cohen illustrates the justification for the rule: If the district court's
decision denying application of the statute, thereby allowing the plaintiffs to proceed without posting a bond, had not been immediately
appealable, the defendant's right to appeal that decision at the end of
the litigation would have been meaningless. 57 The plaintiffs would
already have been permitted to proceed without the bond. The order
in Cohen also met the other two requirements. The district court's
order allowing the case to proceed without the bond conclusively determined the issue of the applicability of the statute. 58 Further, the
applicability of the statute was separate from the merits of the claims
of mismanagement and fraud that formed the basis of the shareholder suit. 59 Permitting the appeal under these circumstances thus is
consistent with the value of accuracy and does not conflict with the
value of finality. Although it may run counter to the value of efficiency, in this case, accuracy trumps efficiency because the cost of an
erroneous decision (the effective loss of the right to appeal) is too
high.60
Cases falling under the collateral order doctrine can be compared
with cashew fruits. This comparison may not be helpful to those unfamiliar with cashew fruits, so some explanation is in order. A cashew
nut grows with a piece of fruit, known as a cashew fruit. In many parts
of the world, people eat the fruit, whereas most of us are more familiar with the nut. 61 Collateral orders are similar to cashew fruits in the
sense that the subject of the litigation (the fruit) is separate from the

57.
58.
59.
60.

61.

Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 1999). This is an
example of a rule designating a new type of order as immediately appealable pursuant to the Supreme Court's rule making power in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(e). See supra note 28.
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556.
Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 546-47.
Courts have categorized a variety of types of orders as collateral orders. See,
e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 141
(1993) (allowing immediate appeal of an order denying a state's claim of
11th Amendment immunity); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
340, 347 & n.8 (1987) (allowing immediate appeal of an order allocating
the costs of identifying class members in a class action suit); Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (allowing immediate appeal of an order
denying a government official's claim of qualified immunity). The collateral order doctrine can also be invoked in criminal cases. See, e.g., Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176-77 (2003) (allowing immediate appeal of
an order requiring a criminal defendant to take medication in order to
make him competent to stand trial); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United
States, 489 U.S. 794, 798-99 (1989) (noting that the collateral order rule
has been successfully invoked in criminal cases only in limited circumstances involving the following types of orders: orders denying motions to
reduce bail, to dismiss indictments on double jeopardy grounds, and to
dismiss indictments under the Speech and Debate Clause of the
Constitution) .
A picture of a cashew fruit is available on the Internet. The Food Museum-Cashew, http://www.foodmuseum.com/cashew.html (last visited
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collateral order (the nut), although the two parts are joined together
and are part of a single entity. Nevertheless, the nut can be broken off
from the fruit and eaten or processed separately, just as a collateral
order can be appealed without disturbing the integrity of the proceedings on the merits.
One final way of obtaining immediate review of a lower court's actions is through the extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition. 62 These writs, of course, direct an official, such as a district court
judge, to act in a manner necessary to fulfill her duties or stop acting
in a way that is contrary to her authority.63 Although these writs look
like and, in many ways, operate like appeals, they are not appeals. A
petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition is a request separate
from the underlying case that is filed as an original matter with the
appellate court. 64 If the petition is granted, the order is directed to
the judge. 65 Thus, although the extraordinary writs are methods for
obtaining immediate review of lower court actions, they are not true
appeals.
Because of the differences between direct appeals and petitions for
extraordinary writs, the extraordinary writs are best analogized to
watermelons. The reason for the comparison might not be apparent
at first. A petition for an extraordinary writ is comparable to a
watermelon because a watermelon is not a fruit. According to the National Watermelon Promotion Board, a watermelon is a vegetable. 66
Thus, just as a watermelon seems like a fruit, a petition for an extraordinary writ seems like a procedure for an interlocutory appeal.

62.

63.

64.

65.
66.

Sept. 4, 2005). A Coogle image search for "cashew fruit" also retrieves a
number of pictures. The fruit is sometimes called a cashew apple. [d.
The All Writs Act, 28 u.s.c. § 1651(a) (2000), provides that "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 u.S. 578, 582-83 (1943); Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943); see also 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3932.2 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that the technical and historic differences
between mandamus and prohibition are of little concern).
Skil Corp. v. Millers Falls Co., 541 F.2d 554, 558 (6th Cir. 1976) ("A proceeding upon a petition for a writ of mandamus is a separate action, not an
appeal .... "); People exrel. Tinkoffv. Campbell, 212 F.2d 785, 786 (7th Cir.
1954) (explaining that a petition for a writ of mandamus, as a collateral
proceeding, is separate from the parent case and is filed as an original
cause with the appellate court); see also WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra
note 63, at § 3932 (stating that extraordinary writ proceedings are commenced by an original application to an appellate court).
The court below is often named as a party in the mandamus action. See,
e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 124 S.Ct. 2576 (2004), m~ndamus
granted, 406 F.3d 723, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
National Watermelon Promotion Board-Fun Facts, http://www.water
melon.org/index.asp?a=dsp&htype=funn&pid=32 (last visited Sept. 13,
2005).
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In reality, however, the watermelon is a vegetable, not a fruit, and a
petition for an extraordinary writ is a vehicle for obtaining immediate
review of certain actions by the court below, not a true interlocutory
appeal of the underlying case.
Writs of mandamus and prohibition are extraordinary remedies. 67
To obtain a writ of mandamus, the petitioner must first show that he
or she has no other adequate way to obtain the relief sought. 68 This
requirement is intended to prevent litigants from using a petition for
a writ as a substitute for the ordinary appellate process. 69 The petitioner must then demonstrate that the right to the writ is "clear and
indisputable."70 If the petitioner satisfies both of these requirements,
the issuing court must satisfy itself that issuing the writ is an appropriate exercise of discretion under the circumstances. 71 Even if the appellate court disagrees with a decision and might well reverse the
decision on a direct appeal, it is rare for an appellate court to enter an
order telling a lower court that it has acted in an unauthorized or
unacceptable way.72 This is not to say that petitions for extraordinary
67. The Supreme Court has explained the purpose of a writ of mandamus:
[It] has traditionally been used in the federal courts only "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do
so." While the courts have never confined themselves to an arbitrary and technical definition of 'jurisdiction," it is clear that only
exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial "usurpation of
power" will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (citation omitted); accord Cheney, 542 U.S. at_, 124 S. Ct. at 2586 (characterizing mandamus as "drastic
and extraordinary" (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947)));
Steward v. West, 449 F.2d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting the extraordinary nature of writs of prohibition and mandamus and stating that courts
will not issue the writs absent a strong showing that their use is necessary);
Zerilli v. Thornton, 428 F.2d 476, 477 (6th Cir. 1970) (noting the exceptional nature of a writ of mandamus).
68. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (denying petition for a writ of
mandamus to vacate the district court's orders allowing attorneys' fees because the issue could be addressed adequately through an appeal in the
ordinary course of litigation).
69. Id.; see also Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, llO (1964) (noting that it
is not appropriate to use a petition for a writ of mandamus as a substitute
for a direct appeal).
.
70. Wil~ 389 U.S. at 96 (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S.
379,384 (1953)).
71. Id. at 95.
72. See, e.g., Fahey, 332 U.S. at 260 (denying petition for a writ of mandamus to
vacate the district court's orders allowing attorneys' fees because the issue
could be addressed adequately through an appeal in the ordinary course of
litigation); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21,27 (1943) (reversing circuit court's issuance of a writ of mandamus directed toward a district
court because the district court's decision, even if erroneous, was not an
abuse of power, was within its jurisdiction, and was subject to effective review through the normal appellate process).
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writs are never granted, only that the standard for obtaining them is
very high.73
In any appeal, the appellate court must have jurisdiction to hear the
case. Jurisdiction attaches when a final order resolves the litigation
below or when one of the exceptions to the final order rule permits
the appeal. In addition, the appellate court has jurisdiction to resolve
a petition for one of the extraordinary writs.

3.

How Much Review Will the Appellate Court Undertake?

Once a case makes its way to the appellate stage, the appellate court
must decide how much review of the trial court's decision it will provide. The answer turns on two concepts: scope of review and standard of review. Scope of review refers to the breadth of issues the
appellate court is willing to review. Standard of review refers to the
depth, or degree, of scrutiny the appellate court will give to an issue.
Ordinarily, an appellate court first evaluates whether an issue falls
within the scope of its review and then assesses the merits of the issue
according to the appropriate standard of review.
A litigant may identify many errors below that it would like the appellate court to review. Scope of review concerns how many of those
issues the appellate court is willing to consider. 74 A litigant usually
cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal. 75 An appellate court
rarely considers issues that were not raised below or that were not
preserved in the record. 76 The historical basis for this rule goes back
73. For example, a petition for a writ of mandamus may be the only way to get
review in a criminal case because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), permitting certification of certain orders as final, do
not apply to criminal cases. Walter J. Bonner, Federal Interlocutory Appeals
and Mandamus 228 in APPELLATE PRACTICE FOR THE MARYLAND LAWYER:
STATE AND FEDERAL (Paul Mark Sandler & Andrew D. Levy eds., 2d ed.
2001). For a discussion of writs of mandamus in the criminal context, see
generally Wil~ 389 U.S. at 97-98.
74. Kathleen L. Coles, Mixed Up Questions of Fact and Law: Illinois Standards of
Appellate Review in Civil Cases Following the 1997 Amendment to Supreme Court
Rule 341,28 S. ILL. U. LJ. 13, 17 (2003) ("[Scope ofreview],in its narrower
meaning, refers to the particular actions or omissions by the decisionmaker that are or are not subject to review on appeal.").
75. See, e.g., Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556-57 (1941) (noting that appellate courts generally do not consider issues not raised below except in
the exceptional cases in which failure to consider the issue might result in
injustice); United States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 30 (lst Cir. 1992) ("It is a
bedrock rule that when a party has not presented an argument to the district court, she may not unveil it in the court of appeals.").
76. See supra cases cited in note 75. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46 requires
parties to bring errors to the district court's attention:
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; but for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore
been necessary it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or
order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the
action which the party desires the court to take or the party's objec-
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hundreds of years. 77 Before appellate courts existed, litigants who believed the judge or jury made errors in deciding a case brought a new
suit against the judge or jury to hold them responsible for those errors. 78 In the subsequent suit, the judge or jury could not be held
responsible for matters that had not been raised in the initial suit. 79
The modern justification for the rule takes us back to the values of
efficiency, finality, and accuracy. If errors are brought to the trial
court's attention when they occur, the trial judge has an opportunity
to correct them, thus fostering efficiency and accuracy.80 The objection or exception ordinarily must be reflected in the trial record to
demonstrate that the litigant claiming error brought the purported
error to the trial court's attention. 81 The objection or exception may
be in writing, as is often the case with exceptions to jury instructions,
or oral, as is often the case when a lawyer objects to the introduction
of evidence at tria1. 82 In addition, appellate courts do not want litigants to hold back arguments, wait to see how the case is resolved, and
then take another bite at the apple, to use the fruit metaphor in a
different context, with a new argument on appea1. 83 Allowing that
type of litigation strategy runs counter to efficiency and finality by requiring a second forum in which to raise issues that could have been
resolved below. 84 It also runs counter to accuracy. Waiting until appeal to raise an issue deprives the trial court of the opportunity to
make an accurate decision if the issue is, in fact, dispositive. 8s

77.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.

83.

84.
85.

tion to the action of the court and the grounds therefor; and, if a
party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it
is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice
the party.
The same is true in criminal cases. FED. R. CRIM. P. 51 (b).
Edson R. Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IOWA L. REv. 3,
7,9 (1940).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
Busy v. Nevada Const. Co., 125 F.3d 213, 218 (9th Cir. 1942).
Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 457 n.l (3d Cir.
1982), vacated on other grounds, 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure lO(a) provides that:
The following items constitute the record on appeal:
(1) the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court;
(2) the transcripts of the proceedings, if any ....
An objection must appear in the record to be preserved for
appeal.
Moore v. United States, 262 F.2d 216,218 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (explaining that
a defendant cannot hold back an argument in the trial court and then rely
on that argument to seek reversal of his conviction); Busy, 125 F.2d at 218
(explaining why litigants cannot hold arguments aside until the appellate
stage).
MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 56.
Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 457 n.l; see also MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at
56 (explaining that the requirement that issues be raised in the first instance with the trial court flows from concerns of accuracy, efficiency, and
finality) .
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One exception to this rule is the plain error doctrine. If the failure
to raise an issue below is so egregious that refusal to consider it on
appeal would amount to a denial of justice, the appellate court will
consider it for the first time on appea1. 86 For an issue to qualify for
review in the absence of a proper objection below, an error must have
occurred, the error must be "plain," and the error must affect substantial rights. 87 Even when all three factors exist, correction of the error
is within the appellate court's discretion, which it should exercise only
if "the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation ofjudicial proceedings."88 This is obviously a difficult standard to
meet; appellate courts are rarely persuaded to reverse for plain error,
although they do so from time to time. 89
One interesting aspect of the plain error doctrine concerns its relationship to standard of review. The plain error doctrine effectively
collapses the two-step process appellate courts usually use to evaluate
the amount of review they will provide on an issue into one step. As·
noted above, an appellate court usually determines first whether the
issue was raised and preserved below and then evaluates the issue on
the merits. With the plain error doctrine, the evaluation of the merits
determines both the court's willingness to consider the issue and its

86. In criminal cases, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides that
"[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even
though it was not brought to the court's attention." The federal appellate
courts also apply the plain error doctrine in civil cases. See, e.g., Smith v.
Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19,26 (lst Cir. 1999) (applying the plain error standard in a civil case); Crawford v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 131 F.3d 1120,
1124 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying plain error in a civil case). Harmless errors,
by contrast, do not affect substantial rights and must be disregarded. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 52(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 61. A harmless error will not justify reversal. Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 833 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting
that a trial court's ruling will not be overturned for harmless error). A
discussion of plain error would be incomplete without an explanation of
the difference between forfeiture and waiver of a claim. An error to which
no objection is made is forfeited. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733
(1993). The plain error doctrine is a mechanism for obtaining review of a
forfeited claim. Id. at 732. Claims that have been waived, by contrast, will
not be reviewed by an appellate court at all. Id. at 733. Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Id. For example, a defendant who
enters a guilty plea waives the right to a trial. Id. Much litigation centers
on whether a particular waiver is valid, but once a court determines that the
claim was waived, it will not review the claim. Id.
87. Id. at 732; see also Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d at 26.
88. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in
original).
89. The cases in which courts have found plain error are factually varied. See,
e.g., United States v. Hanno, 21 F.3d 42, 48-49 (4th Cir. 1994) (accepting
removal of jurors without notice to the defendant as justification for vacating convictions on plain error review); United States v. Fuchs, 218 F.3d 957,
963 (9th Cir. 2000) (accepting "highly prejudicial" jury instructions as justifying reversal for plain error).
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resolution on the merits. 90 If, after evaluating the merits, a court determines that a plain error exists and is therefore within its scope of
review, the court does not then apply a separate standard of review to
resolve the issue. 91 Rather, a finding of plain error will result in reversal, without reference to the standard of review that otherwise would
apply if the error had been properly preserved. Stated differently, because a plain error is so serious that it requires reversal on the merits,
the court will relax its usual rule requiring that the issue be raised
below.
Once the appellate court determines the breadth of issues it will
consider, it must then determine how closely to review the decision
below, or in other words, the depth of its review. The standard of
review refers to the depth of review the court will provide. 92
Appellate courts generally apply one of three standards of review:
de novo, clearly erroneous, or abuse of discretion. De novo review
gives no deference to the decision below, allowing the appellate court
to reevaluate an issue on its own. 93 It applies primarily to questions of
law. 94 Two reasons are usually advanced for this searching degree of
review. First, a trial court may have to make decisions quickly, in the
heat of trial, whereas the appellate court can take as much time as it
needs to consider and resolve the issue. 95 Second, one of the functions of appellate courts is to clarify ambiguities in the law or even
make new legal rules when necessary, and appellate decisions have
precedential value affecting the resolution of future cases. 96 Giving
90. See Fuchs, 218 F.3d at 962 (noting the discretionary nature of plain error
review).
91. Review for plain error, in effect, is itself a standard of review, obviating the
need for application of additional standards. See Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 385 (2000) (characterizing plain error review as a "familiar standard of review").
92. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 59. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) (9) (B) requires that the appellant'S brief contain "for each
issue, a concise statement of the applicable standard of review (which may
appear in the discussion of the issue or under a separate heading placed
before the discussion of the issues) .... " The appellee's brief may omit the
statement of the standard of review unless the appellee disagrees with the
appellant's statement. FED. R. J\pP. P. 28(b) (5).
93. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991); United States v.
George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1992); Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d
1537, 1539 (lOth Cir. 1991).
94. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994).
95. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(explaining that one reason why appellate courts are better positioned than
trial courts to resolve questions of law is that they are not encumbered by
the process of hearing evidence), abrogated on other grounds fly Estate of
Merchant v. Comm'r., 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991).
96. In reality, a large number of appellate decisions are non-precedential. Amy
E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions fly Statute or Procedural Rule, 79 IND. LJ. 711, 718-19 (2004). Nevertheless, when an appellate court chooses to make its opinion precedential, the

2005]

Appellate Fruit Salad

63

appellate courts plenary review of questions of law is consistent with
this function.
Clearly erroneous is the standard applied to review of questions of
fact decided by the judge. 97 This is a more deferential standard than
de novo review. According to the Supreme Court, "[a] finding is
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."98 The appellate
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, even if
the appellate court might have ruled differently if it had been the trier
of fact. 99
The justifications for this deferential standard also tum on the respective functions of trial and appellate courts. Trial courts find
facts.lO O Appellate courts will not encroach on that function in the
absence of clear error. In addition, trial courts viewing live testimony
are better positioned to assess the credibility of witnesses than are appellate courts that review only transcripts of the testimony.10l The paper record does not allow the appellate court to get the same sense of
the credibility of a witness that the trial court's actual observation provides.10 2 Although credibility determinations are one justification for
the clear error standard, the same standard applies to all factual find-

97.

98.
99.

100.
10l.

lO2.

opinion is binding within the court's jurisdiction. [d. at 727 & n.80. For a
discussion of non-precedential opinions, see generally id.
FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a). This rule governs only findings of fact made by the
trial judge. In reviewing facts found by a jury, "[a]ppellate courts are
bound by a jury's findings when the jury has been properly instructed by
the trial court and there is competent evidence in the record to support the
findings." I.M.A., Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 713 P.2d 882, 887
(Colo. 1986). A discussion of review of jury decisions is beyond the scope
of this article, but for a discussion of reviewing such verdicts, see generally
STEVEN AlAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(3d ed. 1999) and Steven Alan Childress, A Standards of Review Primer, 125
F.R.D. 319 (1989).
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364,395 (1948)).
[d.; Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th
Cir. 1988) ("To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than
just maybe or probably wrong; it must, as one member of this court recently
stated during oral argument, strike us as wrong with the force of a fiveweek-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.").
Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2001) (pronouncing the axiom
that findinj? facts is the role of trial courts, not appellate courts, as a "bread
and butter' principle of appellate review).
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 143 (1958) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial courts on factual questions because the trial court had the opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses' testimony).
[d.
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ings, regardless of whether they are based on the testimony of witnesses or other forms of evidence. 103
The third standard of review is abuse of discretion. This standard is
also deferential to the trial court. Discretion is the authority to make
a reasoned choice.104 Many matters within the course of litigation are
committed to the trial court's discretion. That is, the trial judge has
the authority to choose from among a range of options. If the trial
judge could legitimately have chosen one course of action over another, the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of
the trial judge. 105
A judge can commit an abuse of discretion in three ways: (1) by
failing to consider a factor relevant to the decision; (2) by considering
and giving significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor; or
(3) by making a clear error of judgment. 106 Challenging a.discretionary decision on the ground that the judge made a clear error of judgment is possible, but is an uphill climb because trial judges do not
often make decisions entirely outside the range of the appropriate
options. Arguments based on the other two forms of error are more
likely to be successful because they focus on the decision-making process. For example, if a statute requires a judge to consider specific
factors in making child custody decisions, the judge may abuse her
discretion by failing to consider one of the factors. The error in the
result stems from error in the decisional process, not the judge's error
in judgment.
Often, the character of an issue as one of law, fact, or discretion will
be uncontroversial. In those cases, the determination of the appropriate standard of review will be similarly un controversial. In some cases,
however, the category into which the issue falls will be subject to debate. Some appeals turn on the resolution of the character of the
issue and the corresponding standard of review. 107 If an issue could
arguably be categorized as one of law, fact, or discretion, you may be
able to persuade a court to characterize it in a way that results in application of the standard of review that favors your position. 108
In addition, some issues are mixed questions of fact and law. Mixed
questions of fact and law are those "in which the historical facts are
admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is
103. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.
104. See Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984).
105. Kern, 738 F.2d at 971 ("The very concept of discretion presupposes a zone
of choice within which the trial courts may go either way.").
106. Id. at 970.
107. See, e.g., Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 227 (1991) (stating
the issue in the case as whether the district court's decision was subject to
de novo review or some more deferential standard of review); see also CAROLE C. BERRY, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY § 1.10, at 5 (3d ed. 2003).
108. For a discussion of strategies for persuading a court to apply a standard of
review favorable to your position, see George A. Sommerville, Standards of
Appellate Review, LITlG., Spring 1989, at 23,24 and Childress, supra note 97.

2005]

Appellate Fruit Salad

65

whether the facts satisfy the [legal] standard, or to put it another way,
whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not
violated."109 Some mixed questions are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, while others are reviewed under the de novo standard. To decide the applicable standard of review for a mixed
question of fact and law, the court evaluates whether resolution of the
issue turns more on factual considerations or on the application of
legal principles. 110 If you are arguing a mixed question of fact and
law, the standard of review may well be a critical element in your
argument.
These three standards of review - de novo, clearly erroneous, and
abuse of discretion - are all standards of judicial review. They must be
distinguished from standards of legislative review - strict scrutiny, intermediate or heightened scrutiny, and rational basis. I I I Standards of
legislative review refer to the standards courts use to evaluate the constitutionality of statutes enacted by the legislative branch, a coordinate
branch of government. Standards of judicial review refer to standards
109. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290 n.19 (1982). Examples of
mixed questions include the following: whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1352
(5th Cir. 1981); whether the parties entered into an oral employment contract, Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 2001); and
whether Internal Revenue Service agents acted in good faith in disclosing
taxpayer information during an investigation, Gandy V. United States, 234
F.3d 281,284 (5th Cir. 2000).
110. The concerns of judicial administration are key to the court's analysis of the
appropriate standard of review for mixed questions of fact and law:
If application of the rule of law to the facts requires an inquiry
that is "essentially factual," - one that is founded "on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings
of human conduct," - the concerns of judicial administration will
favor the district court, and the district court's determination
should be classified as one of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. If, on the other hand, the question requires us to
consider legal concepts in the mix of fact and law and to exercise
judgment about the values that animate legal principles, then the
concerns of judicial administration will favor the appellate court,
and the question should be classified as one of law and reviewed de
novo.
McConney V. United States, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds fry Estate of Merchant V. Comm'r.,
947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991); accordVinick V. United States, 205 F.3d 1, 6
(1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States V. Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1328 (1st
Cir. 1993» (noting that the court uses a sliding scale of deference in evaluating mixed questions of fact and law, depending on how fact-dependent
the issue is); see also Miller V. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (noting that
the classification of an issue as one of fact, law, or mixed fact and law at
times turns on the court's assessment of which judicial actor, the trial court
or the appellate court, is in the best position to decide the issue).
Ill. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 97, § 1.03, at 1-22 to 1-23 (distinguishing
'Judicial" review of lower court decisions from "constitutional" review of
legislative choices).
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appellate courts use to review the decisions of lower courts within the
judicial branch. 112
To see the difference, assume that a litigant challenges the constitutionality of a statute by filing suit in the appropriate trial court. The
trial court will apply one of the three standards of legislative review to
determine whether the statute is constitutional. Whether a statute
comports with constitutional requirements is generally a question of
lawY3 Therefore, if the trial court's decision were appealed, the appellate court would ordinarily apply de novo review to determine the
correctness of the trial court's decision regarding which legislative
standard of review should be applied and whether the statute comports with the appropriate standard.
In every appeal, the appellate court must determine whether the
issue or issues presented are within the scope of its review. It must
then determine whether the issue is one of fact, law, or mixed fact and
law. That determination will dictate whether the court will conduct
an independent review of the issue using the de novo standard or give
deference to the decision below using the clearly erroneous or abuse
of discretion standard. Although this determination is routine in a
large number of cases, in some cases the determination of the applicable standard effectively determines the outcome of the case.
II.

CONCLUSION

Understanding who can appeal, when an appeal can be taken, and
how much review an appellate court will undertake is essential to understanding appellate process. A lawyer who does not understand
these concepts may waste a client's time and money by pursuing a
frivolous appeal or may lose an opportunity to appeal. The preceding
discussion does not address every nuance of appellate procedure, but
it does provide a foundation upon which to build. It should at least
give you a sufficient understanding of appellate process to recognize
when issues of standing, appellate jurisdiction, or scope and standard
of review may affect the conduct of an appeal so that you can research
these issues in greater depth when appropriate.

112. Courts also sometimes use the judicial standards of review to evaluate decisions of administrative tribunals in the executive branch. A discussion of
review of administrative decisions is beyond the scope of this article. For a
discussion of review of administrative decisions, see generally CHILDRESS &
DAVIS, supra note 97, pt. 4, §§ 14.01 - 17.06.
113. United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1104 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that a
trial court's decision regarding the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law to be reviewed de novo on appeal).
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APPENDIX A: TESTING YOUR UNDERSTANDING
In answering the questions below, assume that federal law applies.
l. During a criminal trial, two jurors hearing the case (Jurors 4 and
7) appear to be sleeping. One alternate juror could be substituted for
one of the sleeping jurors. If both sleeping jurors are dismissed, however, the judge will have to declare a mistrial. The judge calls counsel
to the bench to discuss the situation, but they cannot agree on which
juror should be replaced. To make the decision, the judge calls her
deputy to the bench and asks the deputy to flip a coin. Heads means
Juror 4 is replaced, and tails means Juror 7 is replaced. The defendant's attorney says, ''I'm not too sure about this, your honor." The
judge ignores the attorney and directs the deputy to flip the coin. It
comes up tails. Juror 7 is replaced, and Juror 4 remains on the panel.
The defendant is convicted. He appeals, asserting error based on
the judge's juror replacement decision.
QUESTION A: The defendant waited until the conclusion of the
case to seek appellate review of the coin flip decision. Was he required to wait, or could he have obtained immediate review of the
coin flip decision?
QUESTION B: Was the issue properly preserved at the trial level?
QUESTION C: Assuming that the issue was properly preserved,
what standard of review will the appellate court apply?
QUESTION D: Assuming that the issue was not properly preserved,
will the appellate court review the coin flip decision?
QUESTION E: Will the defendant win on appeal?
2. A private school promulgates a policy under which no student is
permitted to pray in school. At the beginning of the first class period
each day, students stand and recite the pledge of allegiance, after
which the students observe a moment of silence. When one student
begins praying loudly during the moment of silence, the teacher
throws a white board eraser at her head and tells her to be quiet. The
eraser misses the student, but the incident upsets her greatly.
The student decides to sue the school and the teacher. She contacts an advocacy organization devoted to the protection of religious
freedom, and the organization's legal department agrees to represent
her. Acting on the student's behalf, the organization files suit in U.S.
District Court, claiming that the school's policy violates the student's
First Amendment rights and that the teacher committed the common
law tort of assault against the student by throwing the eraser at her.
The complaint in the case of Student v. Teacher and School seeks an
injunction to force the school to change its policy and money damages against the teacher.
At the close of the discovery phase of the case, the teacher files a
motion for summary judgment on the assault claim, which the plaintiff opposes. The court denies the motion on the ground that there
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are disputes of material fact on the assault claim. Thereafter, the
plaintiff and the school file cross-motions for summary judgment on
the First Amendment claim. The court grants the school's motion,
enters judgment in favor of the school, and denies the request for an
injunction requiring the school to change its policy. The case goes to
trial against the teacher. The plaintiff wins at trial.
The student decides not to appeal the ruling in favor of the school,
so the organization files its own notice of appeal in the case.
QUESTION A: Could the teacher have taken an immediate appeal
of the order denying the motion for summary judgment?
QUESTION B: Could the order granting summary judgment in
favor of the school have been immediately appealed?
QUESTION C: Is the organization entitled to appeal the order
granting summary judgment in favor of the school?
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APPENDIX B: ANSWERS

1. Coin flip hypothetical. (This scenario is based on Golsun v.
United States, 592 A.2d 1054 (D.C. 1991).)
QUESTION A: The defendant waited until the conclusion of the
case to seek appellate review of the coin flip decision. Was he required to wait, or could he have obtained immediate review of the
coin flip decision?
The only way the defendant could have obtained immediate review
of the coin flip decision is through a petition for a writ of mandamus.
It seems unlikely, however, that the defendant would have availed
himself of this procedure, given that his attorney was ambivalent at
best about the coin flip, as discussed more fully below.
The order was not a final order; thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 would not
confer appellate jurisdiction. Immediate review under 28 U.s.c.
§ 1292(a) would not be available because the order does not involve
an injunction. This is a criminal case, not a civil case. Thus, neither
28 U.s.c. § 1292(b) nor Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) applies. The decision regarding the substitution of the juror is not a
collateral order because it does not finally resolve the disputed question. The judge could revisit the decision regarding substitution of
the juror and declare a mistrial if necessary. Further, the order is effectively reviewable on appeal.
QUESTION B: Was the issue properly preserved at the trial level?
Although expressing some doubt about the coin flip procedure, the
defendant's attorney did not state an objection on the record. The
attorney's ambivalent statement is not sufficient to put the judge on
notice that the coin flip was a problem. Thus, it did not give the judge
adequate opportunity to choose another method of decision-making.
The defendant's attorney seemed to be hedging his or her bets, hoping the result of the coin flip would be favorable to the defendant, but
trying to keep the defendant's options open for appeal if the result
did not turn out favorably. This is not a permissible strategy. The
attorney's expression of doubt would not qualify as a proper objection
and would not be sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
QUESTION C: Assuming that the issue was properly preserved,
what standard of review will the appellate court apply?
The court will apply abuse of discretion. The judge had a choice to
make and could validly have chosen to replace Juror 4 or Juror 7,
declare a mistrial, or take other corrective measures to ensure that the
jury was paying attention to the case.
QUESTION D: Assuming that the issue was not properly preserved,
will the appellate court review the coin flip decision?
The only way for the court to review the issue on appeal if it was not
properly preserved is under the plain error doctrine. This seems like
an attractive case in which to apply the plain error doctrine because it
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seems so obvious that the defendant's attorney should have objected
strenuously to the coin flip. Under the Supreme Court's test, however, the error probably does not rise to the level of plain error.
The first two elements of the test are satisfied. The judge committed an error by leaving a discretionary decision to chance. Further,
the error is plain. Clearly, a coin flip is not an acceptable method of
judicial decision-making. The question is whether the error affected
substantial rights. The defendant's attorney was permitted to participate in the juror substitution decision, and as noted above, seemed to
be hedging his or her bets as a litigation strategy. Because the judge,
in the exercise of her discretion, could validly have substituted either
juror, it is not clear that the decision-making methodology employed
actually affected the defendant's rights. The court in Golsun found
that using a coin flip to decide which of two sleeping jurors to dismiss
was not plain error, although the facts of that case are more complex
than those of the hypothetical. 592 A.2d at 1058-59. This illustrates
how difficult it is to obtain review using the plain error doctrine.
Of course, if the court were to find that the error affected substantial rights, it probably would exercise its discretion to correct the error
because using a coin flip to decide a discretionary matter seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. Note also that the defendant might have other options for
challenging his conviction even if the appellate court refuses to consider the coin flip issue on direct appeal. For example, the defendant
might be able to mount a collateral attack on his conviction on the
ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
QUESTION E: Will the defendant win on appeal?
If the issue had been properly preserved so that the appellate court
would apply the abuse of discretion standard, the defendant would
win. Flipping a coin is not an exercise of discretion; it is the abdication of discretion because it leaves the decision to chance, not reasoned choice. Golsun, 592 A.2d at 1057-58. Because the issue was not
properly preserved, however, the defendant will lose because the error does not rise to the level of plain error, as discussed above.
2. First Amendment hypothetical.
QUESTION A: Could the teacher have taken an immediate appeal
of the order denying the motion for summary judgment?
The teacher would not be able to take an immediate appeal. The
denial of summary judgment is not a final order resolving the litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291; all it does is allow the trial to go
forward.
The order does not involve an injunction; thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)
does not apply. Because the court denied the teacher's motion on the
basis of factual disputes, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) probably is not applicable. A factual dispute is unlikely to raise any controlling question of
law about which there is substantial basis for difference of opinion.
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Even if it did, allowing an immediate appeal probably would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation because the
First Amendment claim would remain pending.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) does not apply because, although the case involves multiple claims and parties, the order did
not resolve any claim against any party. The order is not a collateral
order. The assault claim is integral to the merits of the dispute, and
the order can effectively be reviewed on appeal.
A petition for a writ of mandamus to force the trial court to enter
judgment in the teacher's favor on the assault claim is not likely to
succeed because the judge acted within his jurisdiction in deciding
the motion.
QUESTION B: Could the order granting summary judgment in
favor of the school have been immediately appealed?
The order granting the school's motion for summary judgment
could have been appealed immediately. It is not a final order under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, but appellate jurisdiction would lie pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a) because the order denies a request for an injunction.
Further, the order resolves all of the claims against the school, thus
making it eligible for certification as a final order pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
Depending on the nature of the issues in the case, it is possible that
the First Amendment claim raises a controlling question of law about
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. This
would potentially make the order eligible for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), although an immediate appeal probably
would not materially advance the termination of the litigation, given
the pending assault claim. The order is not a collateral order because
it goes to the very heart of the case and is effectively reviewable on
appeal.
A petition for a writ of mandamus to force the district court to grant
the injunction is unlikely to succeed and in any event is unnecessary
because the order is immediately appealable on the grounds discussed
above.
QUESTION C: Is the organization entitled to appeal the order
granting summary judgment in favor of the school?
Although the organization may feel aggrieved by the decision, it is
not a party to the case. The student is the plaintiff; the organization's
lawyers were merely representing her. Unless the organization is permitted to intervene for purposes of the appeal, it will not be allowed
to pursue the appeal.

